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Operation Miracle (Rhodesia)

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Operation Miracle
(or the Battle of Mavonde)
Part of the Rhodesian Bush War (or Second Chimurenga)

Eland-90 armoured cars of the Rhodesian Armoured Corps
Date27 September – 6 October 1979
Location
Result Rhodesian Victory
Belligerents
 Zimbabwe Rhodesia ZANLA
FRELIMO
Commanders and leaders
Lt. Gen Peter Walls
Lt. Col Ron Reid-Daly
Capt. Richard Passaportis
Gp Cap. Norman Walsh
Solomon Mujuru
Paradzai Zimondi
Josiah Tungamirai
Units involved

Rhodesian Army

RhAF

  • No.1 Squadron
  • No.5 Squadron
Mavonde base
Strength
100 Selous Scouts
100 RLI
6 Eland Mk 6 Armoured cars
20 Unimogs
1 (Pig) Armoured Command car
4 Canberras
4 Hawker Hunters
4 Alouette III (1 K-Car) (3 G-Cars)
several Impala (ZANLA claims)
6,000
4 tanks (T-55s)
Casualties and losses
8 killed
3 wounded
1 Canberra and 1 Hawker Hunter shot down
1 Alouette III crashed
ZANLA:
~Hundreds
Frelimo:
1 tank destroyed

Operation Miracle, or the Battle of Mavonde, was a military raid in 1979 by the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) against ZANLA guerrilla bases in Mozambique towards the end of the Rhodesian Bush War. ZANLA put up stiff resistance, although at the cost of many losses with as many as hundreds dead. The tactical success of the RSF did not lead to the expected strategic changes but did result in a decisive tactical victory with few losses.

Background

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After successful Rhodesian air attacks on ZANLA bases, such as Operation Snoopy, the guerillas chose to set up a new camp under the shelter of the forest near Mavonde, a few kilometers from Chimoio. As the Lancaster House discussions were taking place, RSF attempted to annihilate this base,[1] hoping to weaken the Zimbabwean position.[2]

The base was held by 6,000 ZANLA partisans, with many anti-aircraft weapons on hills. Many guns were located on the highest hill, later to be nicknamed "Monte Cassino."[1] Two secondary hills, Hill 774 and Hill 761, were also dotted with anti-aircraft guns.[3] These weapons were supplied by the Ethiopian Derg.[4] Trenches were dug in the 64-square-kilometers surface of the camp.[2] The base was commanded by Solomon Mujuru, known by his nom-de-guerre, Rex Nhongo.

Small-scale Rhodesian patrols erroneously estimated the ZANLA force to be 2,000 men strong;[2] 200 Rhodesian soldiers were earmarked for the operation, with 100 men of the Selous Scouts spearheading the raid.[2] Each of the ten-men was transported in a Unimog truck. The whole column, commanded by captain Richard Passaportis,[5] contained 20 Unimogs, protected by Eland-90 armoured cars of the Rhodesian Armoured Corps.[6] A detachment of QF 25-pounder guns was also part of the column.[5] The Selous Scouts were supported by 100 men of the Rhodesian Light Infantry (2 Commando, 3 Commando, and Support Commando),[7] air-dropped 10 kilometers away from the camp.[6]

Targets

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Mavonde Base in 1979 had grown to encompass around 60 square kilometers.[8]

  • Base 1 - HQ
  • Bases 2 & 3 - for troops who already completed their training and/or who would return from mission
  • Base 4 - training
  • Base 5 - security, including prisons
  • Bases 6 & 7 - logistics

Operation

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Due to bad weather, the start of operations had to be delayed several days.

First day

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Before attacking the base, the RSF ground forces had to cross a river. The artillery was bogged down, and the guerilla was alerted to the size of the column.[5] The column was further delayed by ZANLA fire.[9][5] The first wave of the Selous Scouts began clearing the trenches, but the rest of the column only arrived late in the afternoon.[5] Meanwhile, the airdropped Rhodesian Light Infantry joined the battle, and Mpunzarima, a key ZANLA military leader, was killed.[9] At dawn, Nhongo distributed marijuana to some of his troops to reduce their stress.[10] The Rhodesian troops were harassed during the night by RPG-7s, recoilless-rifles and mortars.[5]

Second day

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RSF renewed its assault. Nhongo personally went to the front to boost the morale of his troops, using a big stick to hit those reluctant to fight.[10] Guided by a Reims Cessna "Lynx" aircraft, Hawker Hunter attack jets neutralized ZANLA fortifications in Hill 774. The position was taken at 3 p.m. by a troop of the Selous Scouts.[3] English Electric Canberra bombers also bombed the anti-aircraft positions.[6]

Third day

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During the night, RSF artillery fired at ZANLA positions to prevent the partisans from sleeping.[10] At 10 a.m., two troops of Selous Scouts and a RLI section (around 100 men) led an assault on Monte Cassino. The summit was taken after the partisans had retreated, as was Hill 761.[11] At the end of that day, Nhongo ordered his fighters to retreat, with mortar teams providing cover fire.[12] During the late night, FRELIMO sent three or more T-34 or T-54 tanks[7][10][11] and a squad of infantry to support the rebels, but RSF 25-pounders quickly reacted, guided by Rhodesian SAS, and the tanks retreated after the lead tank was put out of action.[10][11]

Consequences

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The Rhodesian force withdrew on the morning of 6 October,[11] taking captured equipment with them.[13] To avoid retaliation attacks from Mozambique, the Rhodesian Air Force bombed FRELIMO facilities, but one Canberra and one Hunter were shut down.[11] ZANLA suffered hundreds of casualties[14] but was largely intact. The battle had no consequences for the Lancaster House discussions.[1]

References

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  1. ^ a b c Tendi 2020, p. 110.
  2. ^ a b c d Moorcraft & McLaughlin 2008, p. 114.
  3. ^ a b Baxter 2011, p. 133.
  4. ^ Tendi 2020, pp. 110–111.
  5. ^ a b c d e f Baxter 2011, p. 132.
  6. ^ a b c Moorcraft & McLaughlin 2008, p. 116.
  7. ^ a b Wessels & Scheepers 2018, p. 160.
  8. ^ "Mavonde battle decisive in liberation struggle". sundaymail.co.zw. 18 October 2020. Retrieved 7 July 2024.
  9. ^ a b Tendi 2020, p. 111.
  10. ^ a b c d e Tendi 2020, p. 112.
  11. ^ a b c d e Baxter 2011, p. 136.
  12. ^ Tendi 2020, p. 113.
  13. ^ Baxter 2011, p. 135.
  14. ^ Moorcraft & McLaughlin 2008, p. 117.


Bibliography

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