December 2021 Russian ultimatum to NATO

On 17 December 2021, during the prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia published a list of demands for security guarantees in the form of two draft treaties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States. The proposals included a ban on Ukraine and other ex-Soviet countries from joining NATO, and a roll-back in deployments of NATO troops and weapons in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia had long been concerned with the decline in its self-regarded sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics which were aligning themselves with the West economically and politically, although they were obstinately dissatisfied with the existing security architecture and NATO expansion. The demands, issued during a period of high tensions during which about 100,000 Russian troops were massed on Ukraine's borders, were widely seen as an ultimatum and attempt by Russia to exert pressure and influence on the Western countries. The main demands were rejected by NATO and the U.S. on 26 January 2022. The Russian invasion of Ukraine followed one month later on 24 February.

Background

After World War II, the Soviet Union established Warsaw Pact nominally a "defensive" alliance, however the Pact's primary function was to safeguard the Soviet Union's hegemony over its Eastern European satellites. De facto, the Pact was a direct reflection of the USSR's authoritarianism and undisputed domination over the Eastern Bloc, in the context of the so-called Soviet Empire. The Pact's only direct military actions having been the invasions of its own member states to keep them from breaking away, as per the Brezhnev Doctrine policy that permitted only limited independence of the satellite states' communist parties and that none would be allowed to compromise the cohesiveness of the Eastern Bloc in any way. Decisions in the Pact were ultimately taken by the Soviet Union alone; the countries of the Warsaw Pact were not equally able to negotiate their entry in the Pact nor the decisions taken. By contrast, in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military alliance including the United States and its allies in Europe), all decisions required unanimous consensus in the North Atlantic Council despite the American hegemony (mainly military and economic) over NATO. The entry of countries into the NATO alliance was not subject to domination but rather a natural democratic process.

Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, including the disbanding of Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO expanded its membership eastward, eventually incorporating all former Pact countries as well as several former republics of the Soviet Union. Russian military actions, including the First Chechen War, were among the factors driving Central and Eastern European countries, particularly those with memories of similar Soviet offensives, to push for NATO application and ensure their long-term security.

NATO expansion has been a point of contention for Russia, which views it as a breach of assurances made by Western leaders in the early 1990s, and as a strategic encirclement aimed at undermining its security. Although Russia has obstinately described NATO expansion as a threat, Putin was actually more concerned about the loss of Russia’s perceived sphere of influence in former Soviet republics which were aligning themselves with the West economically and politically. Putin aimed to regain control of these republics as part of re-establishing Russia as a great power.

Putin has aimed to create disruption within the NATO alliance, by establishing relationships with NATO members Hungary and Turkey. With numerous Western European countries dependent on Russia for energy, particularly Germany which was a major benefactor of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, Putin believed that NATO was too divided and would not stand in his way.

Putin initially attempted to install a pro-Russian government in Kyiv, including the poisoning of pro-Western presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko, but this backfired due to the Orange Revolution. While Putin's effort succeeded in 2010, the massive Euromaidan protests in 2013 forced pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych into exile. The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and subsequent war in the Donbas marked the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War, leading to diplomatic fallout and the imposition of economic sanctions by Western nations.

On 12 June, Russian President Vladimir Putin published his essay "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians", which openly questioned Ukrainian territorial integrity and claimed that it was a "product of the Soviet era" formed "on the lands of historical Russia". A Kremlin-affiliated outlet described the essay as his "final ultimatum to Ukraine".

Starting in 2021, Russian units that were originally intended to defend against a NATO invasion had been withdrawn from actual land borders with NATO in order to support the expected invasion of Ukraine. Russia significantly increased its military presence along its border with Ukraine, massing about 100,000 troops by December. The build-up was viewed as a show of strength, and as a pressure tactic aimed at compelling Western concessions. US intelligence also uncovered Russian false flag operations and disinformation campaigns in occupied Donbas that aimed to create a justification for the invasion in January and early February of 2022. Putin had framed Ukraine as a threat to Russia and claimed a potential attack upon Russian-occupied territories and Russia in 2022, even though the Kremlin had assessed Ukraine’s military capabilities and will to fight to be so weak that Russian forces would overrun the country in a matter of days.

Ultimatum

On 15 December 2021, Putin submitted "specific proposals" on Russia's demands for security guarantees from the West to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Karen Donfried. Two days later, on 17 December, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published the demands in the form of two draft treaties with NATO and the U.S., proposing limits on their influence and activities in Europe. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said that "The line pursued by the United States and NATO over recent years to aggressively escalate the security situation is absolutely unacceptable and extremely dangerous". Ryabkov also stated that Russia was ready to begin negotiations as soon as 18 December, and suggested Geneva as a possible venue.

The first draft treaty, titled "Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", included the following provisions, among others:

• that NATO members commit to no further enlargement of the alliance, including in particular to Ukraine
• that NATO deploy no forces or weapons in countries that joined the alliance after May 1997
• a ban on deployment of intermediate-range missiles in areas where they could reach the other side's territory
• a ban on any NATO military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, or Central Asia
• language on consultative mechanisms, such as the NATO–Russia Council, and on the establishment of a hotline

The second, titled "Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees", included the following:

• a requirement that both countries "not implement security measures … that could undermine core security interests of the other Party"
• a requirement that the United States undertake to prevent further NATO enlargement
• a ban on deployment of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe
• limits on the ability of heavy bombers and surface warships to operate in and over international waters in range of the other side
• a requirement that both side's nuclear weapons only be deployed on national territory

Reception

The primary demand from Russia to halt NATO's eastward expansion was rejected by NATO and the U.S., which argued that Russia should not have a veto on the alliance's expansion and that it had the right to decide its own military posture, defending its open door policy as a fundamental principle of the organization. In response to the draft treaties, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that any dialogue with Russia "would also need to address NATO's concerns about Russia's actions, be based on core principles and documents of European security, and take place in consultation with NATO's European partners, such as Ukraine". U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stated that the U.S. was committed to the "principle of nothing about you without you" in shaping its foreign policy in Europe. Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Ukraine had an "exclusive sovereign right" to run its foreign policy, and only it and NATO could determine the relationship between them, including the question of its potential membership.

Some Western political analysts suggested Russia was knowingly presenting unrealistic demands to provide a diplomatic distraction while maintaining military pressure on Ukraine, with Michael Kofman calling the draft treaties a "smokescreen" and Sam Greene calling them a "declaration" rather than a basis for negotiation.

Boris Bondarev, a Russian diplomat who later resigned in protest of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, recalled that the draft treaties had shocked many Russian diplomats and that he immediately viewed the demands as non-negotiable. Bondarev also stated that during a dinner amid bilateral U.S–Russia strategic stability talks in Geneva on 10 January 2022, that Ryabkov had screamed at U.S. officials, including Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, that "[Russia] need[s] Ukraine! We won't go anywhere without Ukraine! Get out with your belongings [to the 1997 borders]!".

NATO and U.S. response

According to The New York Times, high-level U.S. officials conducted more than 180 meetings with their European counterparts in the weeks after the Russian demands. The NATO and U.S. response to the proposals was drafted together, and approved by U.S. President Joe Biden and Ukraine.

On 26 January 2022, NATO and the U.S. issued their formal response to Russia, in which they rejected demands that Ukraine never join NATO and that the alliance withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe; the confidential document was later published by El País. It called on Russia to withdraw forces from Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, and discussed a potential transparency mechanism to confirm the absence of U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles at two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland in exchange for transparency at two ground-launched missile bases in Russia. Other areas indicated for negotiation were a potential revival of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and new mutual rules limiting the size and locations of military exercises. Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, later recalled that Russian diplomats were "pleasantly" surprised with the proposals and believed that they could achieve agreements which would strengthen Russian security, but that the Kremlin was uninterested.

On 17 February, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a response in which it stated that the NATO and U.S. proposals were not "constructive" and that both parties continued to ignore Russia's "red lines and core security interests", and threatened that Russia would be forced to respond through the implementation of unspecified "military-technical measures". One week later, on 24 February, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

See also

• Soviet ultimatum to Finland
• Soviet ultimatum to Romania
• Soviet ultimatum to Lithuania